Foreign Travel, Foreign Considerations, Suspicious Contact, Outside Activities

The United States is the dominant political, economic, and military force in the world. We have power, information, and technology that other countries want, and they will not hesitate to harm or exploit U.S. persons to obtain it.
 
The mission of foreign intelligence services is to obtain or steal any information that could be useful to their country, and they will exploit whomever they can to meet this objective. For a foreign intelligence agent, every interaction is a potential data mine. Even if a person does not have direct access to information, they are a step on the pathway to someone who does. Your spouse, children, relatives, and friends are steppingstone to you. You are a step toward your boss or a government customer. Foreign intelligence agents are patient. They will spend years cultivating relationships, and will use anyone they can get access to, to connect dots along the way.
 
Every U.S. person is a potential target for exploitation. Our work in the government space means that we are of particular interest to foreign actors. It makes us, and our loved ones, far more likely to be targeted. For this reason, we must take extra precautions when interacting with any foreign person(s), foreign entity, foreign business, or foreign organization. We must know what we are required to report and when we must report it.
 
Foreign Travel
U.S. Citizens are often targeted while traveling outside the U.S. Even in “safe” countries, there are risks and precautions we must take to ensure safety and awareness when traveling.
 
The threat landscape is vast. Tourist attractions and high traffic areas are prime targets for terrorist attacks. The presence of foreign intelligence agents is exponentially increased in other countries. Even simple criminal elements, like petty thieves, are a much greater risk to our safety and data when we are traveling. We are on their turf, and they know it, so it is crucial that we be hypervigilant in protect ourselves and our belongings when traveling.
 
Foreign intelligence agents may go for a quick grab, breaking into your vehicle or hotel room to see if there is easy info to steal. They will pose as friendly helpers such as tour guides, hotel workers, restaurant workers, taxi drivers, etc., just going about their business with open ears or waiting for an opportunity to connect and establish that first pathway toward exploitation. Foreign agents are often placed in positions where they have a strategic authoritative role such as police, emergency services, or airport security. Here they will have the ability to detain and questions U.S. citizens under laws that are much different than those we are accustomed to in the U.S. Any information we may have due to our work with the Federal government is of value to them.
 
The threat of targeting and exploitation is significantly higher when an individual travels outside the U.S. As such, federal contractor facilities and their personnel are subject to foreign travel briefing and reporting requirements as outlined in 32 CFR Part 117, SEAD 3, and certain program specific reporting guidelines. FSOs are required to provide travel safety briefings, country specific briefings, and post-travel debriefing. Travel to certain locations will require special pre and post travel briefings with a DCSA CISA and almost all travel must be formally reported to the DoD and/or the government customer prior to the person’s departure. These briefing and reporting requirements must be considered any time we are planning to travel outside the U.S., even to Mexico and Canada.
 
Whether your travel is personal in nature, business related, government contract related, etc., reporting it to your FSO will ensure proper briefing and reporting can be identified and administered relevant to your specific circumstances. For this reason, we recommend that all contractor personnel (employees and consultants) report any travel outside of the United States, both personal and professional, to their company’s FSO at least 30 days prior to departure (whenever possible). Your company’s FSO is in the best position to determine what types of briefing and reporting are required for you and your specific travel occurrence.
 
Pre-Travel: Ideally any travel outside the US should be reported to your FSO at least 30 days prior to your departure to allow appropriate time to prepare your travel briefings and complete any necessary reporting. When 30 days’ notice is not possible, the travel should be reported immediately upon booking.
 
For those that live in border areas, unexpected day trips to Mexico and Canada should still be reported prior to departure but MUST be reported within 5 days of return.
 
Changes to your travel itinerary should be reported to your company’s FSO as soon as possible.
 
Post-Travel: Foreign travel debriefing is required. Covered individuals should contact their company’s FSO immediately upon return to complete post travel debriefing requirements.
 
Also important to note: If you are assigned or stationed at a location outside of the US, and travel outside of the country of your duty location, this is required foreign travel reporting!
 
 
Foreign Considerations (Contact, Influence, Interests, Activities, Conflicts of Interest)
Foreign contact, foreign influence, and foreign activities are a significant consideration for anyone working in the U.S. Government space. Everyone working with a Federal Contractor facility should be aware of foreign considerations that they must report whether that information is about themselves or another person.
 
Covered individuals are required to self-report any contact with foreign nationals, potential foreign influence, foreign activities or interests, suspicious contact, any information that could raise concerns of a perceived conflict of interest, or any other information pertinent to connections with a foreign country or foreign persons.
 
Foreign considerations may be considered a national security concern if they increase the risk of divided allegiance, create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in any way that is inconsistent with U.S. interests, or if the circumstances could make the individual vulnerable to pressure or coercion by a foreign interest.
 
The U.S. Government assesses risk with consideration to the country involved. There are many factors to consider, such as, the foreign country’s history of criminal activity, government upheaval, terrorism, targeting U.S. Citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information, etc.
 
It is the government’s job to determine the level of acceptable risk in these situations, so all foreign considerations must be reported to your company’s FSO. Failure to report or fully disclose association with a foreign person, group, government or country when required, could result in loss of eligibility.
Foreign considerations can create a heightened risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. They must be reported whether they are personal or business related. If it touches a foreign person, country, government, business, organization, etc., you will have reporting requirements.
 
Conditions that must be reported include, but may not be limited to:

• Any contact (through any method including social media) with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, acquaintance, or any other person who is a citizen or resident of a foreign country, whether they live in a foreign country of here in the United States.
• Shared living quarters with any person(s), regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship could create a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
• Any business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business.
• Any unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence entity.
• Any conduct, especially while traveling or residing outside the U.S., that may make an individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.
• Any connection to any foreign person, group, government, or country that could potentially create a perceived conflict of interest to the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology.
• Any indication that an individual may desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing classified or sensitive information or technology.
• Any indication that representatives or nationals of a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of an individual for exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
• Any information that indicates that an individual’s access to classified information or eligibility for a sensitive position may be a risk to national security.

 
Foreign Preference
When and individual gives preference to a foreign country over the U.S., they are far more vulnerable to exploitation, more likely to provide information to malicious actors, and more susceptible to making decisions that could be harmful to U.S. interests. Foreign preference can raise concerns about an individual’s judgement, reliability, and trustworthiness, especially when they try to conceal it or become involved in activities that could conflict with U.S. interests.
 
Conditions that could raise concern, and must be reported, include but are not limited to:

• Applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country.
• Failure to report or fully disclose to appropriate security officials the possession of a passport or identity card issued by any country other than the U.S.
• Failure to use a U.S. passport when entering or exiting the U.S.
• Assuming or attempting to assume any type of employment, position, or political office in a foreign government or military organization.
• Any activity wherein the person is acting to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government in any way that conflicts with U.S. national security interests.
• Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country in violation of U.S. law.
• Any act of expatriation from the U.S., such as declaring an intent to renounce U.S. citizenship, whether through words or actions.
• Any indication, whether through works or actions, indicating that an individual shows preference to any foreign country over the U.S.

 
By itself, a U.S. citizen also having citizenship in another country is not necessarily disqualifying or derogatory, however, it must be reported so that it can be appropriately adjudicated. The same is true for U.S. citizens that may exercise any right or privilege of foreign citizenship or any action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship.
 
Suspicious Contact
Suspicious contact is any effort by any individual, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to information or to compromise an individual. This includes any contact with known or suspected intelligence officers from any country, or any contact which suggests the individual concerned may be the target of an attempted exploitation.
 
Examples of Suspicious Contact that must be reported include, but are not limited to:

• Any individual’s efforts, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to sensitive or classified information or to compromise an individual.
• All contact with known or suspected foreign intelligence operatives.
• Any contact that suggests foreign intelligence services may be targeting an individual for exploitation.
• Any request by a foreign national to visit a cleared facility, wherein there is no clear and logical purpose.
• Any contact, including business contacts, requesting information outside the scope of a contract or agreement.
• Any contact requesting a person to participate in a foreign conference, seminar, tradeshow, etc.
• Any contact seeking information about your work, job duties, coworkers, etc.
• Any contact requesting that a person violates company policies or security procedures.
• Any illegal or unauthorized attempts to access export-controlled information and material.

 
If you have any reason to believe that you have received suspicious contact, you must report it to your company’s FSO immediately upon occurrence.
 
Outside Activities
Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities, whether foreign entity related or not, could be a security concern if it poses a conflict of interest that could interfere with an individual’s responsibilities, or if it could increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive information.
 
Outside Activities Involving Foreign Entities (Foreign people, governments, businesses, organizations, etc.)
 
Some conditions that could raise concern, and must be reported, include but are not limited to:

• Any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with:
• The government of a foreign country,
• Any foreign nation, organization, or other entity,
• A representative of any foreign interest; and
• Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
  
• Any failure to report or fully disclose any foreign considerations or suspicious contact.

 
Outside Activities NOT related to Foreign Entities
Failure to report any employment or service with another organization, when required by your company or the government program you support, whether foreign related or not, whether compensated or volunteer, is considered a security risk. For example, if your organization or the government program you are supporting prohibits you from having a second job, speaking at conferences, having self-employment activities, moonlighting, etc., Failure to report raises a big red flag so, reporting is critical.
 
Why Reporting is Critical & How to Report Concerns
Full transparency and self-reporting about any foreign considerations is vital. All of the scenarios detailed above can raise concerns about a person’s suitability for access to classified or sensitive government information and must be thoroughly vetted by U.S. Government adjudicators.
 
Failure to report is always worse than reporting. Security clearance and suitability vetting are predicated on trust. If you have been entrusted with access to classified or sensitive government information, full transparency is expected.
 
Failure to report will always be viewed by Adjudicators from a lens of, “what is this person trying to hide and why?” If investigators find information on their own before you self-report, the red flag is much bigger and brighter and, the majority of the time, will garner steeper consequences than if you had simply reported the information yourself.
 
All covered individuals must report any foreign travel, foreign considerations, suspicious contact, and outside activities to their company’s FSO. Your company’s FSO is in the best position to ensure reporting is provided to the appropriate parties as required for individuals to maintain their eligibility for access to classified or sensitive information.
 
Should you have any question about how these reporting requirements may be relevant to you, please contact your company’s FSO!
 
Resources and Additional Learning

• CDSE Foreign Travel Defensive Briefing
• Foreign Contact - What is Reportable
• DCSA Self-Reporting
• Reporting Requirements at a Glance
• NISP Reporting Requirements
• SEAD 3 – Reporting
• SEAD 3 ISL2021-02
• SEAD 3 Short
• SEAD 3 Toolkit
• SEAD 4 – Adjudicative Guidelines
• Adjudications – The Whole Person Concept
• Personnel Security Toolkit
• Reporting Job Aid
• Suspicious Emails
• Identifying Suspicious Contact
• What to Report – Examples of Suspicious Contact
• Reporting Requirements Crossword
• Reporting Requirements Word Search
• Case Study Library
• 32 CFR Part 117 (NISPOM Rule)
• 32 CFR Part 147 (Adjudicative Guidelines)

 
As always, if you have any questions about whether or not a situation requires reporting, ask your FSO! Your company’s FSO is the best person to help you navigate any questions you have about security compliance, briefing, and reporting requirements. As security professionals, we are here to help you navigate things to ensure you fulfill all requirements